Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets by Moore, Adam D
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 28 XXVIII 
Number 4 Article 3 
2018 
Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory 
Justification of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets 
Adam D. Moore 
University of Washington - Seattle Campus, moore2@u.washington.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, Law and Economics Commons, and the Law and 
Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of 
Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets, 28 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 831 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol28/iss4/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification of 
Copyrights, Patents, and Trade Secrets 
Cover Page Footnote 
Adam D. Moore is a Professor in the Information School at the University of Washington and examines 
the ethical, legal, and policy issues surrounding intellectual property, privacy, freedom of speech, 
accountability, and information control. The basic idea for this paper was informally discussed at the 
Center for the Protection of Intellectual Property (CPIP) conference on the philosophical foundations of 
intellectual property, Jekyll Island, May 19–20, 2016. Thanks to Chris Newman, Eric Claeys, Adam 
Mossoff, Matthew Barblan, and the other conference participants for their comments about game theory, 
the prisoner’s dilemma, and intellectual property. Special thanks goes to Jennifer Rosenblatt and Matthew 
Hershkowitz for comments, suggestions, and editing assistance. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol28/iss4/3 
  831
Intellectual Property and the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma: A Game Theory Justification 
of Copyrights, Patents, and Trade 
Secrets 
Adam D. Moore* 
In this article, I will offer an argument for the protection of 
intellectual property based on individual self-interest and 
prudence. In large part, this argument will parallel considerations 
that arise in a prisoner’s dilemma game. In brief, allowing content 
to be unprotected in terms of free access leads to a sub-optimal 
outcome where creation and innovation are suppressed. Adopting 
the institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way to 
avoid these sub-optimal results. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A major concern and limitation on traditional justifications for 
intellectual property is that few scholars accept the starting 
assumptions needed to generate the desired moral claims. For 
example, utilitarian incentives-based arguments for intellectual 
property have been rejected for both external and internal reasons. 
These arguments center on promoting social utility by 
incentivizing authors and inventors to innovate in exchange for 
limited rights. Externally, as a moral theory, utilitarianism has 
come under attack for failing to account for special obligations, 
claims of distributive and retributive justice, and undermining 
individual integrity or life-long project pursuit.1 Internally, even 
assuming that utilitarianism is the correct moral theory, it is not at 
all clear whether individual ownership of intellectual works can be 
justified, or more generally, whether the institutions of copyright, 
patent, and trade secret, are warranted.2 More specifically, it would 
be difficult to justify twenty-year patent monopolies or lifetime-
plus-seventy-year copyrights on utilitarian grounds.3 
Starting with Lockean labor-mixing accounts, or other 
foundational assumptions, seems to fare no better. According to 
Locke, by mixing labor with an unowned object, individuals could 
come to own the item in question.4 David Hume argued that the 
idea of mixing one’s labor is incoherent—actions cannot be mixed 
with objects.5 Robert Nozick asked, why isn’t mixing what I own 
                                                                                                             
1 See generally SAMUEL SCHEFFLER, THE REJECTION OF CONSEQUENTIALISM (rev. ed. 
1994); CONSEQUENTIALISM AND ITS CRITICS (Samuel Scheffler ed., 1988); Bernard 
Williams & J.J.C. Smart, UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST (1973). 
2 See Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31–
52 (1989); ADAM D. MOORE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION CONTROL: 
PHILOSOPHIC FOUNDATIONS AND CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 37–71 (New York: Routledge 
Pub. 2004) (2001); Adam D. Moore, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Social 
Progress: The Case Against Incentive Based Arguments, 26 HAMLINE L. REV. 602–30 
(2003) [hereinafter Moore, Incentive Based Arguments]; HUGH BREAKEY, INTELLECTUAL 
LIBERTY: NATURAL RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38–58 (New York: Routledge 
Pub. 2012). 
3 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988), 35 U.S.C.§ 154(a)(2) (1994). 
4 JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, ch. 5, § 27 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 
Hackett Pub.1980) (1690). 
5 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE bk. 3, pt. 2, § 3 (L.A. Selby-Bigge 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1896) (1739); see also, Jeremy Waldron, Two Worries about 
Mixing One’s Labor, 33 PHIL. Q. 37, 40, 41 (Oxford Univ. Press 1983). 
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(my labor) a way of losing my labor rather than obtaining a 
property right?6 P.J. Proudhon questioned why, if labor is 
important, shouldn’t the second laborer on an object obtain a 
property right in an object as reliably as the first laborer?7 Jeremy 
Waldron and others have argued that mixing one’s labor with an 
unowned object should yield more limited rights than rights of full 
ownership.8 These challenges have not gone unnoticed among 
defenders of Lockean-based arguments for private property.9 In 
each case, however, internal and external objections are offered, 
leaving the justification for intellectual property compelling only to 
those who find the initial assumptions plausible. 
In this Article, and setting aside various foundational moral 
entanglements, I offer an argument for the protection of intellectual 
property based on individual self-interest and prudence. While 
consequences play a fundamental role, the argument and analysis 
discussed below are not utilitarian in nature. There is no 
maximization of net or average utility required. In large part, this 
argument parallels considerations that arise in a prisoner’s 
dilemma game. In Part I, a sketch of the salient features of 
prisoner’s dilemma games is provided. Examining the nature of 
intellectual property and how content creation, exclusion, and 
access can be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma is the focus of Part 
II. In Part III, empirical evidence is offered and analyzed. In brief, 
allowing content to be unprotected in terms of free access will lead 
to a sub-optimal outcome where creation and innovation are 
                                                                                                             
6 ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174–75 (Basic Books 1974). 
7 P.J. Proudhon, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 61 (Howard Fertig 1966) (1867); see also John 
Plamenatz, MAN AND SOCIETY 247 (McGraw-Hill 1963). 
8 Waldron, supra note 5, at 42; Geraint Parry, JOHN LOCKE 52 (1978). 
9 See generally A. JOHN SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1994) (1992). See also, Adam Mossoff, Saving Locke from Marx: The Labor 
Theory of Value in Intellectual Property Theory, 29 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 283 (2012); 
Moore, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION, supra note 2; Adam D. Moore, A 
Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property Revisited, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1069 (2012) 
[hereinafter Moore, Lockean Theory Revisited]; Adam D. Moore, Intangible Property: 
Privacy, Power, and Information Control, 35 AM. PHIL. Q. 365 (1998); Adam D. Moore, 
A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65 (1997) [hereinafter 
Moore, Lockean Theory]; Kenneth Einar Himma, Justifying Intellectual Property 
Protection: Why the Interests of Content-Creators Usually Wins Over Everyone Else’s, in 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 47 (Emma Rooksby & John Weckert 
eds., 2006). 
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suppressed. Finally, in Part IV, it is argued that adopting the 
institutions of copyright, patent, and trade secret is one way we can 
avoid the sub-optimal results of playing an intellectual property 
prisoner’s dilemma. 
I. THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA10 
The classic version of a prisoner’s dilemma game begins with 
two individuals and two choices.11 Fred and Ginger are picked up 
by the police and charged with robbing a bank. Each are given the 
choice of informing (ratting) on the other or staying silent. If Fred 
rats on Ginger and she remains silent, he is set free and she will be 
sentenced to life in prison. If Ginger rats on Fred while he remains 
silent, then she is set free while he is sentenced to life in prison. If 
both rat on each other, then both are sentenced to twenty years in 
jail. Finally, if both stay silent, then each will be sentenced to one 
year in jail. 
Figure 1: 
                                                                                                             
10 See Robert Axelrod, The Emergence of Cooperation Among Egoists, 75 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 306 (1981) [hereinafter Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation]; ROBERT 
AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Basic Books 1984) [hereinafter Axelrod, 
EVOLUTION]; BRIAN SKYRMS, THE DYNAMICS OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION (Harvard 
Univ. Press 1990). 
11 See Merrill M. Flood, Some Experimental Games, 5 MGMT. SCI. 5 (1958). The story 
is credited to Albert Tucker. See Sylvia Nasar, Albert W. Tucker, 89, Pioneering 
Mathematician, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at A20, https://www.nytimes.com/1995/01/27
/obituaries/albert-w-tucker-89-pioneering-mathematician.html [https://perma.cc/JL2A-
5NQ6].  
836         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:831 
 
 
Both Fred and Ginger prefer freedom to one year, one year to 
twenty years, and twenty years to life in prison. Given the 
structure, payoffs, and preferences, the option of “ratting” 
dominates over the option of “staying silent.” That is, no matter 
what the other player does, it is always better to rat. Ginger would 
reason the following way: “Suppose Fred rats, then I will do better 
to rat as well and avoid the sentence of life in prison. Suppose Fred 
stays silent, then I will do better if I rat and attain freedom. Either 
way, ratting is better.” Of course, Fred is engaging in the same sort 
of reasoning and thus both are driven to a sub-optimal outcome. 
Both will rat. The lesson of such a game is that prudentially 
rational, self-interested players will end up with sub-optimal 
outcomes.12 Collectively, however, both would do better if each 
remained silent. If Fred and Ginger could just cooperate, then they 
could each avoid the harsh result of spending twenty years in 
prison. This option yields what economists call “Pareto 
optimality”13—what is individually rational may well be 
collectively irrational. 
A. Iterated and Multi-Player Prisoner’s Dilemmas 
Prisoner’s dilemma games can also be played between two 
players numerous times. Imagine that Fred and Ginger were going 
to play an iterated prisoner’s dilemma game with no known end 
point.14 They might play ten rounds or one hundred rounds of the 
game. In this sort of game, when both can reasonably guess that 
the game will continue for some time, strategies like tit-for-tat 
dominate.15 A tit-for-tat strategy starts off with cooperation (non-
                                                                                                             
12 Thus, ratting is said to dominate staying silent and is a “Nash equilibrium.” “A Nash 
equilibrium is any profile of strategies—one for each player—in which each player’s 
strategy is a best reply to the strategies of the other players.” Ken Binmore, Why all the 
Fuss? The Many Aspects of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: 
CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 16, 20 (Martin Peterson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 
2015). 
13 Pareto conditions are named after Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923), an Italian economist 
and sociologist. See Vilfredo Pareto, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com
/biography/Vilfredo-Pareto [https://perma.cc/A6VF-BNQ2] (last visited Nov. 2, 2018). 
14 See Axelrod, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 10. 
15 See Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation, supra note 10, at 311. For indefinitely 
repeated prisoner’s dilemma games tit-for-tat is a Nash equilibrium. 
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ratting) and then imitates the opponent’s previous move in 
subsequent rounds.16 The problem is that if either player guesses 
the game is nearing its end, defection or ratting becomes the 
dominant strategy once again.17 Defection, or threat of defection, 
pressures players to not cooperate as the game progresses.18 
Rather than a two-person game, consider a multi-player game 
with an unknown number of counterparts. In this version of the 
game, if only one person rats, then that person is set free while the 
others all get life in prison. If more than one player rats, then those 
that rat get twenty years while those that remain silent get life in 
prison. Finally, if everyone remains silent, then each player is 
sentenced to one year in prison. As with the single-player version 
of the prisoner’s dilemma game, the option of ratting dominates 
over staying silent. Again, what is individually rational yields a 
collectively sub-optimal outcome. 
The tragedy of the commons can also be modeled as a multi-
player prisoner’s dilemma game.19 Garret Hardin writes, 
If a pasture becomes a commons open to all, the 
right of each to use it may not be matched by a 
corresponding responsibility to protect it. Asking 
                                                                                                             
16 Id.; see also Axelrod, EVOLUTION, supra note 10, at 13. 
17 Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation, supra note 10, at 307, 312. 
18 Pettit and Sugden offer a critique of this argument. See Phillip Pettit & Robert 
Sugden, The Backward Induction Paradox, 86 J. PHIL. 169 (1989). While this backward 
induction argument has been challenged in two-person iterated prisoner’s dilemmas with 
no known end point, it is not at all clear that such considerations hold in multi-player 
iterated prisoner’s dilemmas. 
19 See Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1243–48 (1968); 
see also, R. M. Dawes, Formal Models of Dilemmas in Social Decision Making, in 
HUMAN JUDGEMENT AND DECISION PROCESSES 87, (M. F. Kaplan & S. Schwartz, eds., 
Academic Press, 1975); Xin Yao & Paul J. Darwen, An Experimental Study of N-Person 
Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Games, 18 INFORMATICA 435 (1994) (James E. Alt & 
Douglass C. North eds., 1st ed. 1990); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE 
EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION (Cambridge Univ. Press 1990). 
Others have modeled public goods problems, like the tragedy of the commons, as 
assurance, chicken, or voting games. See Luc Bovens, The Tragedy of the Commons as a 
Voting Game, in THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 156 
(Martin Peterson ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015); Geoffrey Brennan & Michael 
Brooks, The Role of Numbers in Prisoner’s Dilemmas and Public Good Situations, in 
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 177 (Martin Peterson 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
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everyone to use it with discretion will hardly do, for 
the considerate herdsman who refrains  
from overloading the commons suffers more  
than a selfish one who says his needs are  
greater. If everyone would restrain himself,  
all would be well; but it takes only one less  
than everyone to ruin a system of voluntary 
restraint. In a crowded world of less than perfect 
human beings, mutual ruin is inevitable if there are 
no controls. This is the tragedy of the commons.20 
 
In this sort of example, value will be destroyed if it is overused. 
Adding in one or two extra sheep will benefit me at only a slight 
cost to others who use the commons. The result of each herder 
thinking this way is overgrazing, and the destruction of the 
commons. Admittedly, some overgrazing is within the carrying 
capacity of the typical commons. Nevertheless, there will be some 
amount of overuse that cannot be sustained. Once this point is 
reached, overgrazing will ensure the destruction of this common 
resource. As with the two-person version of a prisoner’s dilemma 
game, there appears to be a dominant action. Each player would do 
better by overusing the commons no matter what the other players 
do.21 Individuals acting prudentially lead to a collective tragedy. 
B. Solutions to the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Solutions to prisoner’s dilemma-style games are varied.22 One 
possibility would be to change the payoffs in the game. For 
example, imagine that a government, or Hobbes’ Leviathan,23 
                                                                                                             
20 Garret Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor, PSYCHOL. 
TODAY, Sept. 1974, at 800. 
21 For a rich discussion of these issues, see MICHAEL TAYLOR, THE POSSIBILITY OF 
COOPERATION (1987); Phillip Pettit, Free Riding and Foul Dealing, 83 J. PHIL.  
361 (1986). 
22 For recent experiments exploring different ways to solve the prisoner’s dilemma, see 
Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson, & David Schmidtz, Prisoner’s Dilemma Experiments, in 
THE PRISONER’S DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 243 (Martin Peterson, 
ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2015). 
23 Thomas Hobbes’ solution to a version of the prisoner’s dilemma was to institute a 
powerful government, a Leviathan, to incentivize individuals to cooperate. THOMAS 
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76–103 (Rod Hay ed., McMaster Univ. 1999) (1651) 
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would penalize individuals who acted out of prudence or narrow 
self-interest. In the two-person version of this scenario, a payoff of 
freedom would come with some sanction like severe weekly 
beatings. In this case, prudence and self-interest would lead toward 
silence and a collectively optimal solution. In multi-player games, 
like Hardin’s tragedy of the commons, the Leviathan could simply 
penalize those who overuse shared resources. Hardin’s own 
solution to the tragedy of the commons was to assign property 
rights along with corresponding legal obligations and privileges.24 
By setting up institutions of private property, the negative 
consequences of overuse can be internalized by those who own the 
land.25 
Another solution to the tragedy of the commons or the 
prisoner’s dilemma game is to only play with individuals that you 
trust. By being a transparent and public cooperator, a player can 
choose accordingly, and thus avoid sub-optimal outcomes.26 
Imagine a close-knit community where ratting on each other, or 
being non-cooperative, would be known to everyone. Those who 
made decisions based on narrow self-interest would find 
themselves at a disadvantage or ostracized altogether. 
The Silk-Road escrow and reputation system was a real-life 
example of how to solve a prisoner’s dilemma.27 The Silk-Road 
was an anonymous online drug buying and selling black market.28 
                                                                                                             
https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/ugcm/3ll3/hobbes/Leviathan.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CTG3-ATFA]. 
24 Hardin, supra note 19, at 1245. 
25 Id. at 1247. 
26 See DAVID GAUTHIER, MORALS BY AGREEMENT (1986); David Gautheir, How I 
Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Prisoner’s Dilemma, in THE PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA: CLASSIC PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS 35 (Martin Peterson ed., Cambridge 
Univ. Press 2015); see also Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden, Theories of Team Agency, in 
MICHAEL BACHARACH, BEYOND INDIVIDUAL CHOICE: TEAMS AND FRAMES IN GAME 
THEORY 280 (Natalie Gold & Robert Sugden eds., Princeton Univ. Press 2006). 
27 The original Silk Road was seized by the FBI in 2013 only to rise again in different 
iterations. New decentralized markets and cryptocurrencies are being developed with 
presumably new technological ways to solve the prisoner’s dilemma problem. For a 
history of the Silk Road and its founder, Ross Ulbricht, see Joshuah Bearman, The Rise & 
Fall of Silk Road, WIRED (May 2015), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/silk-road-1/ 
[https://perma.cc/638C-LCWL]. 
28 See id. 
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Using Bitcoin as the currency and the Tor onion browser29 to 
access the site, buyers and sellers connect to complete transactions. 
If a mechanism to ensure cooperation did not exist, the problems 
are obvious. If a seller could collect money first and then send the 
drugs, there would be no reason to actually send the product. 
Sellers could just keep the money and the drugs. Conversely, if the 
drugs were sent first, buyers would have no reason to send 
payment. Moreover, both buyers and sellers could reenter the 
market using different account names, so that the history of their 
prior uncooperative acts would be unknown. The optimal outcome 
would be for a party to receive the item (money or drugs) without 
completing the transaction. The next best outcome would be for a 
complete transaction: the seller receives the money and the buyer 
receives the drugs. The sub-optimal outcome would be no 
exchanges for either party. Finally, for the seller, the worst 
outcome would be to have sent the drugs and not received 
payment. The worst outcome for the buyer would be to have sent 
the money and not received the drugs. 
The Silk-Road, and many of its imitators, solved this problem 
by having the buyer place the purchase money in an escrow 
account, which could only be released to the seller once the drugs 
arrived as advertised.30 In this case, the system administrator, the 
Dread Pirate Roberts, would collect a small fee from the money in 
the escrow account and send the Bitcoins on to the seller.31 
Additionally, reputation also played a role in this system. Sellers 
and buyers could leave feedback about the product or payment.32 
                                                                                                             
29 “Tor stands for ‘the Onion Router’ and was launched by the Navy in 2002.” See id. 
30 See id. 
31 The Dread Pirate Roberts was the fictional name of the Silk Road’s administrator 
Ross Ulbricht. The Silk Road’s escrow account was a bitcoin holding account controlled 
by Ulbricht. See id. 
32 Andy Greenberg, Meet the Dread Pirate Roberts, the Man Behind Booming Black 
Market Drug Website Silk Road, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2013, 11:31 AM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/08/14/meet-the-dread-pirate-roberts-
the-man-behind-booming-black-market-drug-website-silk-road/#500b0bf88b73 
[https://perma.cc/47FH-RFUK]. 
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Both parties could attain a reputation of fair dealing with other 
buyers and sellers.33 
One of the problems associated with the Silk Road and its 
progeny is that there is nothing that keeps the escrow 
administrators honest. The best administrators develop a reputation 
of fair dealing and always paying off sellers upon notification of 
product arrival and quality. But, as these sites grow, there might be 
millions of dollars’ worth of Bitcoins held in escrow accounts, and 
there is nothing buyers or sellers can do if the administrators 
simply abscond with the entire escrow account. This is called an 
“exit scam.”34 Modeled as an iterated prisoner’s dilemma, this 
would amount to one of the parties being able to unilaterally end 
the game after securing optimal results. In this version, the two 
players are the administrator and the buyer/seller, the latter being 
thought of as one combined player. The current solution for exit 
scamming by administrators is for buyers and sellers to only work 
in small exchanges or markets and to risk only a small percentage 
of their bankroll or product at one time.35 Moreover, there is also 
the possibility of automating the administrator’s function. If the 
game has no end and the administrator fees cannot be changed, 
then perhaps a collectively optimal equilibrium will emerge. In any 
case, as discussed below, the use of reputation and escrow 
accounts will not provide a solution for a prisoner’s dilemma 
involving intellectual property content, creation, and copying.36 
II. CONTENT CREATION AND COPYING MODELED AS A PRISONER’S 
DILEMMA 
Imagine that we have two intellectual property creators, Crusoe 
and Friday, and two possible outcomes for each. In a single-play 
                                                                                                             
33 Andy Greenberg, The Dark Web Drug Lords Who Got Away, WIRED (June 2, 2015, 
10:42 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/06/dark-web-drug-lords-got-away/ [https://
perma.cc/V6H5-YUHW]. 
34 Andy Greenberg, The Silk Road’s Dark-Web Dream is Dead, WIRED (Jan. 14, 2016, 
7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/the-silk-roads-dark-web-dream-is-dead/ 
[https://perma.cc/KZG7-QPFX]. 
35 This is exactly the strategy noticed by Charles Holt, Cathleen Johnson, and David 
Schmidtz. See Holt et al., supra note 22, at 251–52. 
36 See infra Part II. 
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prisoner’s dilemma game, each player can copy an intellectual 
creation of the other, or not. Assume as well that the intellectual 
works created by Crusoe and Friday are valuable, interesting, or 
desired. The best case for either player is that their own intellectual 
creation is not copied, and yet they get to copy the work of the 
other player. This is ‘best’ for the player who copies and ‘worst’ 
for the player who does not because (1) the player who copies 
enjoys or consumes more content compared to the other player; (2) 
the player who copies still has the option or possibility of obtaining 
a benefit by selling, trading, or bartering with the other player, 
while the non-copier does not enjoy these possibilities—which 
provides a way to recoup research and development costs; and (3) 
via selling, trading, or bartering, the copier may obtain a positional 
advantage and more capital for future exchanges compared to the 
non-copier. Simply put, the copier obtains more content and retains 
more opportunities to sell, barter, or exchange than the non-
copier.37 
If Friday and Crusoe both refrain from copying each other, 
then each will avoid the worst outcome in terms of recouping 
investment costs and being at a positional disadvantage. Both will 
also retain the option of buying or bartering for the non-copied 
content, which the other enjoys. This payoff is ‘okay,’ better than 
‘worst,’ but not as good as ‘best.’ If both Friday and Crusoe copy 
each other, then both will get extra content to enjoy and will not be 
put at a positional disadvantage, but each will be denied the 
possibility of recouping research and development costs. Alas, the 
other player will not buy or barter for content he or she already 
possesses. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
37 Law Professor Sean O’Connor reminds us that ‘real life’ cases may actually be 
worse. O’Connor writes: “Some innovators are economically benefitting from their own 
IP-protected services by monetizing these services through a model that undermines 
creators’ IP. In other words, when Google, for example, uses its advanced algorithms to 
profit from advertising and data mining tied to links to pirate sites or copyright-infringing 
content on its subsidiary, YouTube, it is very much relying on its patents, trade secret, 
copyright, and contract protections on these algorithms so that other search and social 
media firms cannot simply duplicate this code.” Sean M. O’Connor, Creators, 
Innovators, and Appropriation Mechanisms, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 973, 995 (2015). 
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Figure 2: 
 
Assuming that Crusoe and Friday both prefer ‘best’ to ‘okay,’ 
‘okay’ to ‘bad,’ and ‘bad’ to ‘worst,’ this scenario produces the 
structure of a single-play prisoner’s dilemma, where copying 
dominates. Given that it is plausible to assume that content 
creation depends on time, effort, industry, capacity creation, and 
other investments, it is not implausible to model Crusoe and 
Friday’s preferences this way. 
Crusoe would reason the following way: “Suppose Friday 
copies, then I will do better to copy as well. I will not be able to 
trade my intellectual work with Friday in the future because he 
already has a copy, and thus I will have fewer opportunities to 
recoup research and development costs. Moreover, I will have less 
content to enjoy, and if this content would provide greater health 
and well-being, I may suffer a positional disadvantage as Friday 
amasses more capital. Supposing that Friday does not copy, then I 
will do better by copying for reasons already mentioned. Either 
way, copying is better.” Of course, Friday is engaging in the same 
sort of reasoning and thus both are driven to copy. Finally, 
knowing this ahead of time, those who would engage in content 
creation may well deploy their efforts in other ways to avoid these 
risks. If this analysis is plausible, it is not far-fetched to assert that, 
without protections against copying, there would be a natural 
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suppression of intellectual property creation. Neither Crusoe nor 
Friday would find it prudent to engage in such creative activities.38 
Consider a slightly different case. Imagine that Crusoe is a 
content creator and Friday is a mere content consumer. This cannot 
be modeled as a prisoner’s dilemma, because Crusoe has no choice 
to copy or not to copy; however, it does illustrate the futility of 
Crusoe’s position if he chooses to create content. In the short run, 
Friday has everything to gain and nothing to lose by copying the 
intellectual works of Crusoe. Thus, Crusoe has nothing to gain by 
engaging in the necessary research and development needed to 
create intellectual works. All of this becomes more salient when 
we move to iterated prisoner’s dilemma games with numerous 
players. Crusoe is not just playing with Friday, but rather he is 
playing with thousands, perhaps millions, of other content creators 
and consumers. Moreover, if we allow for the possibility of both 
copying and downstream economic exploitation of copied 
intellectual works, the suppression of content creation seems to be 
guaranteed. If so, a sub-optimal result follows. 
Consider the following illustration. Suppose that after months 
of effort and numerous failed experiments, Bonnie creates a new 
recipe for spicy noodles. Clyde, on the other hand, has spent years 
creating a new widget-making machine. Both of these creations 
are, let us suppose, useful and greatly desired by others living and 
working nearby. Both Bonnie and Clyde can expect to recoup their 
investment costs, and perhaps earn a living, by selling or licensing 
noodles or widgets. Bonnie and Clyde enter a prisoner’s dilemma 
game when both are given the opportunity to copy and exploit the 
intellectual efforts of the other. While walking by Clyde’s house, 
Bonnie could peek in the window and take a quick picture of 
Clyde’s widget-making machine designs, build the same widget-
making machine, and quickly start producing widgets. At the same 
                                                                                                             
38 Sean O’Connor notes that quality requires sustained immersion in a practice. 
Moreover, such immersion requires an ‘appropriation mechanism’ to protect income and 
to recoup costs. O’Conner writes, “There is, however, a direct and pragmatic argument 
for the value of a full-time creative class: maintaining and being at the top of one’s craft 
requires daily practice . . . . The importance of daily engagement in one’s craft is well 
represented by performing artists such as musicians, who refer to the phenomenon as 
‘chops.’ To ‘keep his chops up,’ the musician must constantly practice.” Id. at 990. 
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time, Clyde could peek in Bonnie’s window, take a picture of her 
recipe, and then start selling the noodles. 
Note that nothing important turns on the fact that Bonnie and 
Clyde are selling artifacts rather than the ideas that make up the 
recipe or machine design. For example, Clyde could sell Bonnie’s 
recipe, the set of ideas, to local chefs for a fee. Alternatively, 
Bonnie could sell Clyde’s widget-making machine designs to local 
merchants. In either case, because neither has incurred research or 
development costs, both would be able to market the set of ideas at 
a lower price point than the other. 
The best case for Bonnie and the worst for Clyde would be if 
Bonnie copies and Clyde does not. Without the investment costs, 
Bonnie would likely be able to sell widgets at a lower price than 
Clyde, thus easily capturing a dominant market share. This is the 
worst case for Clyde because he would likely lose all of his start-
up investment costs and ongoing market share. Moreover, by not 
copying and exploiting Bonnie’s recipe, Clyde would be at a 
competitive and positional disadvantage. Bonnie would be able to 
gather more profits and deploy this capital to her advantage. In the 
case where neither player copies or exploits the intellectual 
creations of the other, both could expect to do ‘okay’—not as good 
as ‘best,’ but better than ‘worst.’ If both do not copy, both could 
expect to recoup investment costs and perhaps make a profit. 
Moreover, neither would attain a competitive and positional 
advantage. 
Finally, if both creators copy and exploit the efforts of the 
other, then neither could expect to recoup the investment costs of 
their own original invention. Whatever costs Bonnie has incurred 
in creating the recipe, Clyde has avoided. Thus, Clyde would be 
able to sell the noodles at a lower price point than Bonnie. This 
would also be true of Bonnie if she sells widgets. Additionally, for 
Bonnie, assuming that each product has approximately equal 
investment costs, in cases where both parties copy and exploit the 
intellectual efforts of the other, she would do better to sell widgets. 
Clyde, in similar conditions, would do better to sell noodles. By 
copying and exploiting the efforts of the other, both Bonnie and 
Clyde might recoup the investment costs for their own lost 
intellectual efforts. 
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What would stop Clyde or Bonnie from giving away their own 
intellectual efforts or the efforts of the other player? Clyde or 
Bonnie could post the noodle recipe or widget-making machine 
designs on the Internet or any other public sharing site. In this case, 
both players would lose investment and start-up costs, but neither 
would be at a positional disadvantage. 
Furthermore, rather than assuming that Bonnie and Clyde have 
similar investment costs, imagine that the investment costs of 
creating the noodle recipe is a fraction of the cost of creating the 
widget-machine designs. In this case, other things being equal, 
Bonnie would have an advantage.39 By selling widgets she would 
be able to recoup the investment costs of developing the noodle 
recipe before Clyde would be able to recoup the investment costs 
of developing the machine by selling noodles. Once Bonnie has 
recouped her costs and perhaps pocketed a nice profit, she could 
simply give away her noodle recipe for free. If she does this, then 
Clyde’s ability to sell noodles for a profit would vanish. Knowing 
this, Clyde might consider posting online the designs of his widget 
machine in order to undermine Bonnie’s ill-gotten widget market. 
After copying and exploiting the intellectual efforts of each 
other—Clyde taking and exploiting Bonnie’s noodle recipe and 
Bonnie taking and exploiting Clyde’s widget-making machine 
designs—they would both have to consider the further non-
cooperative act of publicizing these intellectual works, and thus 
undermining the other’s income capacity. 
An iterated version of this dilemma might run as follows: 
Suppose Bonnie and Clyde each have numerous opportunities to 
copy the intellectual works of the other. Both have lots of novel 
machine designs or new recipes. Additionally, each knows that 
they will face the question of copying and exploiting the other’s 
work or refraining from copying and exploiting the other’s work. 
The sub-optimal outcome is assured if both Bonnie and Clyde 
decide to copy and exploit the intellectual creations of the other. 
Both would quickly move on to other more profitable pursuits and 
content creation would be minimized. This is analogous to the 
                                                                                                             
39 In this scenario, it is assumed that both Bonnie and Clyde make approximately the 
same monthly income by selling noodles or widgets, and that the other benefits and 
expenditures are similar. 
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“always defect or rat” mindset in iterated prisoner’s dilemmas. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that both parties choose to cooperate, 
opting not to copy or exploit the intellectual works of the other, 
and to continue following this principle for as long as the other 
player continues to cooperate. Both adopt a “tit-for-tat strategy.”40 
If so, the sub-optimal result would be avoided and both Bonnie and 
Clyde would be able to market their own intellectual efforts, 
recoup investment costs, trade content with each other, and avoid 
ending up in a disadvantaged position. 
As soon as we look to an iterated game with multiple players, 
which includes both content creators and mere content consumers, 
it is highly unlikely that a tit-for-tat strategy would be adopted.41 
First of all, content consumers would have no compelling reason to 
adopt a tit-for-tat strategy because they have nothing to copy. If 
enough users and creators copy, then content creation would be 
suppressed and there would be much less content for everyone. 
Everyone would suffer as a result. This sort of reasoning parallels 
the considerations that occur in a tragedy of the commons 
situation.42 The self-interested, prudent individual would seek to 
overgraze his sheep, hoping that others will refrain. Others reason 
similarly and the commons is ruined. 
All of this might be stopped by adopting a robust principle of 
transparency and accountability.43 Imagine that the identities of 
those who overgrazed the commons were made public, and that 
these individuals were shamed or ostracized. Reputations might 
follow these non-cooperative individuals who chose to ruin the 
commons for everyone in order to self-promote. Nevertheless, 
there are two factors working against this analysis as it applies to 
intellectual property. First, the copying of intellectual works is 
easily done in secret. From reverse engineering artifacts to simply 
copying files, no one has to know that my new “Ping” brand golf 
                                                                                                             
40 See Axelrod, Emergence of Cooperation, supra note 10; Axelrod, EVOLUTION, supra 
note 10. 
41 It seems both Aristotle and Hume would agree. See generally ARISTOTLE, 
ARISTOTLE’S POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Clarendon Press 1885) (c. 384–322 
B.C.E.); HUME, supra note 5, at § 7; see also Bovens, supra note 19. 
42 See generally Hardin, supra note 19. 
43 See generally Gauthier, supra note 26. 
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driver is a knock-off copy or that the music streaming from my 
phone was obtained illegally via BitTorrent.44 
Second, copiers are not “frowned upon” or generally ashamed 
of their actions. In fact, most believe that they are not harming 
intellectual property creators or themselves when they copy.45 
When accused of “theft,” copiers typically resort to one or all of 
the following replies: (1) “But I didn’t take anything — they still 
have their copy.” (2) “I wouldn’t have purchased the content 
anyway, so ‘no harm, no foul.’” (3) “Ownership of intangible 
works is misguided—ideas, language, even individuals, are social 
products. We should not allow individuals to monopolize these 
social products.” Elsewhere it has been argued that these replies 
are not compelling, but there is no need to rehash these arguments 
presently.46 At this point, all that should be noted is that 
transparency and accountability as a means for avoiding the sub-
optimal outcome of an iterated prisoner’s dilemma won’t work. 
If the argument presented above is correct, the dominant action 
between two players in a single-play or iterated prisoner’s dilemma 
game is to copy the content of the other. If copying and exploiting 
the market is possible, then this behavior will dominate. Moreover, 
in multi-player iterated prisoner’s dilemma games, copying or 
copying coupled with market exploitation would be rationally 
prudent. Additionally, copying for use or market exploitation 
becomes ever more dominant when we consider content creators 
and users in multi-player situations. 
III. COPYING, INNOVATION, AND THE SUB-OPTIMAL OUTCOME 
While it has been argued that copying or exploiting the 
intellectual efforts of others will lead to a sub-optimal outcome in 
terms of less innovation, this view needs to be more substantially 
                                                                                                             
44 BitTorrent is software that allows peer-to-peer file sharing over the internet. About 
BitTorrent, BITTORRENT, https://www.bittorrent.com/company/about [https://perma.cc
/NB3Z-Y4DJ] (last visited Oct. 25, 2018). 
45 See Adam D. Moore, Privacy, Intellectual Property, and Hacking: Evaluating Free 
Access Arguments, in INTERNET SECURITY: HACKING, COUNTERHACKING, AND SOCIETY 
235 (Ken Himma ed., Jones & Bartlett Pub. 2007), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1980857 [https://perma.cc/UT2C-XS7G]. 
46 See Moore, Lockean Theory Revisited, supra note 9. 
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defended. If innovators would be motivated to create independent 
of compensation and in spite of being able to recoup investment 
costs, then copying would not lead to a suppression of content 
creation and a sub-optimal outcome. 
First, one could argue that there can be no tragedy of the 
commons when considering intellectual property. Given that 
intellectual property cannot be destroyed and can be concurrently 
used by many individuals, there can be no ruin of the commons. 
Upon closer examination, this assertion does not hold true. To 
begin, ask, “What is the tragedy in the typical case?” Generally, it 
is the destruction of some land or other object and the cause of the 
destruction is scarcity and common access. But the tragedy cannot 
actually be the destruction of land or some physical object because, 
as we all well know, matter is neither created nor destroyed.47 The 
tragedy is the loss of value, potential value, or opportunities. 
Where there was once a green field capable of supporting life for 
years to come, there is now a plot of mud, a barren wasteland, or a 
polluted stream. If access to valuable resources is not restricted, the 
tragedy will keep occurring.48 
The tragedy in this, and other such cases, is not only the loss of 
current value, but of future value. Unless access is restricted in 
such a way that promotes the preservation or augmentation of 
value, a tragedy will likely result.49 Now, suppose that intellectual 
works were not protected—that if they “got out” anyone would be 
able to profit from them. In such cases, individuals and companies 
would seek to protect their intellectual efforts by keeping them a 
secret. As noted below, secrecy was the predominant form of 
protection used by guilds in the Middle Ages.50 The result of this 
secrecy can be described as a tragedy or a loss of potential value. If 
authors and inventors can be assured that their intellectual efforts 
will be protected, then the information can be disseminated, and 
                                                                                                             
47 See Henry Guerlac, Lavoisier Antione-Laurent, in 8 COMPLETE DICTIONARY OF 
SCIENTIFIC BIOGRAPHY 66, 84 (8th ed. 2008). 
48 A prime example is the Tongan coral reefs that have been being destroyed by 
unsavory fishing practices. David Schmidtz, When is Original Acquisition Required?, 73 
THE MONIST 504, 513 (1990). It seems that the best way to catch the most fish along the 
reef is to pour bleach into the water, bringing the fish to the surface and choking the reef. 
49 See Hardin, supra note 19, at 1243; Schmidtz, supra note 48, at 513. 
50 See discussion infra Part III. 
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licenses can be granted, so that others may build upon the 
information and create new intellectual works. The tragedy of a 
“no-protection rule” is secrecy, restricted markets, and lost 
opportunities.51 This view is echoed by Professors Roger Meiners 
and Robert Staaf: 
The same story has been told about patents. If 
inventions lost their exclusivity and became part of 
the commons, then in the short run there would be 
over-grazing. The inventor could not exclude 
others, and products that embody previously 
patentable ideas would now yield a lower rate of 
return. There would be lower returns to the activity 
of inventing, so that innovative minds would 
become less innovative. In the case of open ranges, 
common rights destroy what nature endows, and in 
the long run keeps the land barren because no one 
will invest to make the land fertile. Similarly, 
common rights would make the intellectual field of 
innovations less productive relative to a private 
property right system.52 
It should be obvious that such considerations would inevitably lead 
content creators to deploy their efforts in less risky pursuits.53 If 
would-be innovators know that they would likely end up playing 
                                                                                                             
51 Not all secrecy is a bad thing. Surely, keeping sensitive personal information to 
oneself is justified. For more about secrecy and the control of sensitive personal 
information, see generally ADAM D. MOORE, PRIVACY RIGHTS: MORAL AND LEGAL 
FOUNDATIONS (Univ. Park, Pennsylvania: Penn. State Univ. Press, 2010). 
52 Roger Miners & Robert Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or 
Monopoly, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 919 (1990). 
53 William Fisher notes: “[P]otential innovators will know that, once they reveal their 
breakthroughs to the world, other people will be able to take advantage of them for free. 
Consequently, the innovators will be unable to recoup the costs of their innovations (the 
costs of the education they underwent to prepare them to make the innovations, the outlay 
for research and development, their opportunity costs, etc.). Aware of this risk, potential 
innovators will devote their energies to other, more lucrative activities, and society at 
large will suffer.” William Fisher, Intellectual Property and Innovation: Theoretical, 
Empirical, and Historical Perspectives, in 37 INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY, INNOVATION, AND 
THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY, BELEIDSSTUDIES TECHNOLOGIE ECONOMIE 50 (2001); 
see also David J. Teece, Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing and Public Policy, 15 RESEARCH POL’Y 285 
(1986). 
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out prisoner’s dilemma games with each other numerous times, 
and with countless other players, each would pick a different 
profession. The incentives to create intellectual property content 
would be severely undermined. 
Nevertheless, some have called for the elimination of patent 
and copyright regimes in favor of other forms of protection, 
because, it is argued that these institutions are unnecessary for 
innovation and content creation.54 For example, Professors 
Michele Boldrin and David Levine argued that a “first mover 
advantage,” coupled with secrecy and add-on services, is sufficient 
as an incentive for creation and discovery.55 Tom Palmer made a 
similar argument seventeen years earlier, arguing that intellectual 
works should be protected via technological fences and contracts, 
along with bundling in other products and services.56 Richard 
Stallman, focusing on software production, famously argued that 
without copyright or patent protection, programmers would 
continue to produce, “because it is fun!”57 In 1958 Fritz Machlup 
wrote: 
No economist, on the basis of present knowledge, 
could possibly state with certainty that the patent 
system, as it now operates, confers a net benefit or a 
net loss upon society . . . . If one does not know 
whether a system ‘as a whole’ (in contrast to certain 
features of it) is good or bad, the safest ‘policy 
                                                                                                             
54 See generally ERIC SCHIFF, INDUSTRIALIZATION WITHOUT NATIONAL PATENTS: THE 
NETHERLANDS, 1869–1912; SWITZERLAND, 1850–1907 (Princeton Univ. Press 1971); 
Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. AND PUB. AFF. 31 (1989); 
Tom G. Palmer, Intellectual Property: A Non-Posnerian Law and Economics Approach, 
12 HAMLINE L. REV. 261, 303 (1989) [hereinafter Palmer, Intellectual Property]; Tom G. 
Palmer, Are Patents and Copyrights Morally Justified?: The Philosophy of Property 
Rights and Ideal Objects, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 817 (1990) [hereinafter Palmer, 
Patents and Copyrights]; MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL 
MONOPOLY (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2008); N. STEPHAN KINSELLA, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 38 (Ludwig von Mises Inst., 2008). 
55 See, e.g., BOLDRIN & LEVINE, supra note 54, at 142–47. 
56 Palmer, Intellectual Property, supra note 54, at 288–89; Technological fencing 
includes the use of encryption passwords and product registration while bundled services 
would include receiving free software updates or free access to technical support experts. 
57 Richard Stallman, Why Software Should Be Free, GNU OPERATING SYSTEM (1992), 
reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MORAL, LEGAL, AND INTERNATIONAL DILEMMAS 
272–85 (A. Moore ed., Rowman & Littlefield 1997). 
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conclusion’ is to ‘muddle through’—either with it, 
if one has lived long with it, or without it, if one has 
lived without it. If we did not have a patent system, 
it would be irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge of its economic consequences, to 
recommend instituting one. But since we have had a 
patent system for a long time, it would be 
irresponsible, on the basis of our present 
knowledge, to recommend abolishing it.58 
If Machlup is correct, and contra to Boldrin, Levine, Palmer, and 
Stallman, there may be good reasons to retain our intellectual 
property institutions. Moreover, while it is admittedly difficult to 
compare the innovative output of our current system of copyrights, 
patents, global treaties, and competitive markets to other 
arrangements or institutions we might use to promote content 
creation, consider the following argument. 
Imagine that you are a content creator and have the option of 
residing in one of several different city-states. In the city of “No 
Protection” there are no laws to protect the intellectual efforts of 
those who create or discover new intellectual works. In this city, 
protection is left to individual efforts like encryption or secrecy. In 
No Protection anyone can copy and exploit the intellectual efforts 
of anyone else. A short distance away is the city of “Guilds.” In 
Guilds, secretive groups control innovation and uses of inventions 
backed by the force of law. For example, the wool-making guild 
has an ironclad and legally enforceable monopoly over the 
production of wool, along with all wool-making technology. If a 
citizen or visitor invents a better way to produce wool, then the 
guild can seize the innovation and legally prohibit the innovator 
from selling her invention or using it to produce wool.59 Finally, 
there is a third city, called “IP Protection.” In this city, new and 
original intellectual works are protected through the use of various 
legal instruments like copyrights and patents. 
                                                                                                             
58 SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND COPYRIGHT OF THE S. COMM. ON THE 
JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., STUD. NO. 15 ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 79–80 (Comm. Print 1958) 
(prepared by Fritz Machlup) [hereinafter Machlup]. 
59 See, e.g., discussion infra Part III, p. 849–52. 
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If your intellectual efforts include substantial research and 
development costs, it seems that your best option is the city of IP 
Protection. Short of working for free, or because you are already 
financially advantaged, moving to No Protection or to Guilds 
would likely leave you with no way to recover your costs. 
Moreover, you may notice that numerous other innovators are also 
taking up residence in IP Protection, leading to increased 
innovation and healthy markets. Suppose that in response to free 
riders attempting to copy and cash in on the efforts of innovators, 
the city adopted anti-copying statutes where a violation is met with 
ostracism or denied access to the city.60 Sound far-fetched? 
Although there is a different story, this appears to be what 
happened in the Venetian Republic of 1474.61 
Proposed by committee, the general patent statute passed in the 
Venetian Senate in 1474 by a vote of 116 to 10.62 The statute read 
as follows: 
We have among us men of great genius, apt to 
invent and discover ingenious devices; and in view 
of the grandeur and virtue of our City, more such 
men come to us every day from divers parts. Now, 
if provision were made for the works and devices 
discovered by such persons, so that others, who may 
see them could not build them and take the 
inventor’s honor away, more men would then apply 
their genius, would discover, and would build 
devices of great utility and benefit to our 
commonwealth  . . .  Therefore: Be it enacted that, 
by the authority of this Council, every person who 
shall build any new and ingenious device in this 
City, not previously made in our Commonwealth, 
shall give notice of it to the office of our General 
                                                                                                             
60 See Holt et al., supra note 22, at 246. See also A. Gunnthorsdittir, D. Houser, & K. 
McCabe, Disposition, History and Contributions in Public Goods Experiments, 62 J. 
ECON. BEHAVIOR & ORG. 304, 304, 310 (2007) (providing evidence of the synergistic 
effects of cooperators being grouped together). 
61 See generally BRUCE BUGBEE, GENESIS OF AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 
(Pub. Aff. Press 1967). 
62 G. Mandich, Venetian Inventors’ Rights, reprinted in B. BUGBEE, GENESIS OF 
AMERICAN PATENT AND COPYRIGHT LAW 22 (1967). 
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Welfare Board when it has been reduced to 
perfection so that it can be used and operated. It 
being forbidden to every other person in any of our 
territories and towns to make any further device 
conforming with and similar to said one, without 
the consent and license of the author, for a term of 
10 years. And if anybody builds it in violation 
hereof, the aforesaid author and inventor shall be 
entitled to have him summoned before any 
magistrate of this City, by which magistrate the said 
infringer shall be constrained to pay him hundred 
ducats; and the devise shall be destroyed at once.63 
 
This statute appeared 150 years before England’s Statute of 
Monopolies64 and provided the foundation for the world’s first, 
lasting institution of intellectual property protection.65 Moreover, 
the system was remarkably mature and sophisticated. The rights of 
inventors were recognized, an incentive mechanism was included, 
compensation for infringement was established, and a term limit on 
inventor’s rights was imposed.66 
Perhaps as a method to attract skilled individuals and to 
undermine the power of the guilds, the Venetian Republic began 
with rather limited legislation.67 Originally, those who invented 
better technology or made improvements on existing technology 
simply had their efforts seized by the guilds.68 After bitter 
complaining from both citizens and non-citizens alike, the 
Venetian Republic enacted a law that allowed individuals who 
innovated to seek permission to compete from the appropriate 
                                                                                                             
63 Id. 
64 English Statute of Monopolies of 1623, 21 Jam. 1, c. 3. 
65 See generally Bugbee, supra note 61. 
66 Id. 
67 For a concise analysis of the Venetian Republic’s laws protecting intellectual 
property, see Ted Sichelman & Sean O’Connor, Patents as Promoters of Competition: 
The Guild Origins of Patent Law in the Venetian Republic, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1267, 
1267–81 (2012). 
68 “In France, the persecution of innovators by guilds of craftsmen continued far into 
the 18th century . . . for example, in 1726, the weavers guild threatened design printers 
with severe punishment, including death.” Machlup, supra note 58, at 2. 
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guild.69 In this case, if granted permission, the inventor could 
operate within the city and compete with the guild.70 It is hardly 
surprising that the guilds were obstructionist when these requests 
occurred, so after further complaining, the Venetian Republic 
allowed innovators to compete with the guilds without guild 
permission.71 However, this new law was criticized by inventors 
because it allowed the guilds to still take and use the innovations of 
non-guild members.72 Given the widespread guild influence within 
city markets, it was rather easy for the guilds to use the efforts of 
the outside creators and secure a dominant market share.73 Thus, 
finally in 1474 the Venetian Republic included exclusionary rights 
where those who invented new and original intellectual works 
could prohibit all others from using or profiting from these works 
for a period of time.74 Moreover, not only did the Venetian 
Republic and the patent statute of 1474 begin to break up the 
power and control of the guilds, but it also acted as a magnet for 
foreign artisans and as a model for other city-states.75 
 In an interesting article comparing different intellectual 
property systems across different countries rather than city-states, 
Petra Moser makes the following observation: 
In countries without patent laws, inventors depend 
entirely on secrecy, lead-time, and other alternatives 
to patents in protecting their intellectual property. 
As a result, investments in research and 
development may be most attractive in industries in 
which secrecy can effectively guarantee exclusive 
rights long enough to allow inventors to recoup 
their investments. In countries with patent laws, 
inventors can use legal protection to establish 
exclusivity in any industry, so factors other than the 
                                                                                                             
69 See generally Machlup, supra note 58, at 2; Bugbee, supra note 61, at 22; Sichelman 
& O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1272–73. 
70 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1272–73. 
71 Id. at 1274. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 1269. 
74 Machlup, supra note 58, at 2; Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1275.   
75 Sichelman & O’Connor, supra note 67, at 1279. 
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effectiveness of secrecy determine the direction of 
technical change.76 
This helps to explain why patents are under-utilized in different 
technology sectors. For example, in the early 1980s research and 
development executives in the industries of electrical equipment, 
primary metals, rubber, and textiles, claimed that “patent 
protection was not essential for the development or introduction of 
any of their inventions.”77 Even so, most of the innovations were 
patented anyway due to the perceived benefits compared to the 
patent costs.78 Moreover, and more importantly, the ability to 
protect innovations through the use of trade secrets seemed to be 
the guiding principle for those inventions not covered by patent 
protection.79 
Citing literature focusing on innovation within the 
pharmaceutical industry, William Fisher notes, “60% of the 
pharmaceutical inventions made between 1981 and 1983 would not 
have been developed at all and 65% of those inventions would not 
have been introduced into commerce if patent protection had been 
unavailable.”80 Within the chemical industry, 30% of the 
innovations would not have occurred without patents.81 In 
“petroleum, machinery, and fabricated metal products, patent 
protection was estimated to be essential for the development and 
introduction of about 10-20 percent of . . . innovation.”82 Again, if 
not for patents and secrecy, supported via a regime of trade secrets, 
society seemingly gets less innovation. 
                                                                                                             
76 Petra Moser, Patents and Innovation: Evidence from Economic History, 27 J. OF 
ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES 23, 30 (2013) (emphasis in original); see also David Kline, Do 
Patents Truly Promote Innovation? IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 15, 2014), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/15/do-patents-truly-promote-innovation/id=48768/ 
[https://perma.cc/PB9Z-DMTU]. 
77 Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 MGMT. SCI. 174 
(1986). 
78 See id. at 176. 
79 For an argument that trade secret protections are property claims, see Eric Claeys, 
Intellectual Usufructs: Trade Secrets, Hot News, and the Usufructuary Paradigm at 
Common Law, in INTELL. PROP. AND THE COMMON LAW 404 (Shyam Balganesh ed., 
2015). 
80 Fisher, supra note 53, at 10. 
81 Id. 
82 Mansfield, supra note 77, at 174. 
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If the number of issued patents is used as a proxy for 
innovation, the United States, along with several other countries, 
has a distinct advantage.83 Others have noted that the United States 
spent over $400 billion in research and development in 2011, more 
than double that of its closest competitor China: “U.S. based 
inventors received nearly 2 ½ times the number of U.S. patents 
compared” to its nearest rival.84 Robert J. Barro and Xavier Sala-I-
Martin note that, over the long run, the world’s growth rate is 
largely 
driven by discoveries in the technologically leading 
economies. Followers converge at least part way 
toward the leaders because copying is cheaper than 
innovation over some range. As the pool of 
uncopied ideas diminishes, the cost of imitation 
tends to increase . . . the consequence from the 
absence of intellectual property rights across 
economies . . . [is] the leading places tend to have 
insufficient incentive to invent, and the follower 
places tend to have excessive incentive to copy.85 
These empirical findings support the earlier contention that in 
single-play or iterated, multi-player, prisoner’s dilemma games, the 
dominant strategy would be to copy the intellectual efforts of 
others and avoid upfront investment costs.86 
                                                                                                             
83 William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341 (2013). 
84 Christopher B. Seaman, American Innovation and the Limits of Patent Law: A 
Response to William Hubbard, 23 FLA. L. REV. FORUM 24 (2013) (internal citations 
omitted). 
85 Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-I-Martin, Technological Diffusion, Convergence, and 
Growth, 2 J. ECON. GROWTH 1, 23 (1997) (emphasis added); “Whether through wisdom, 
ideology, or good fortune, the framers of the U.S. patent system fashioned a structure that 
has had a powerful impact on the patterns of inventive activity and generally worked 
well. According to Abraham Lincoln—himself a patentee—the system ‘added the fuel of 
interest to the fire of genius.’ Its attention to the provision of broad access to, and strict 
enforcement of, property rights in new inventions, coupled with the requirement of public 
disclosure, was extremely effective at stimulating the growth of a market for technology 
and promoting technical change.” Kenneth L. Sokoloff & B. Zorina Khan, Intellectual 
Property Institutions in the United States: Early Development and Comparative 
Perspective, 9, presented at World Bank Summer Research Workshop on Market 
Institutions (July 17–19, 2000), http://www.dklevine.com/archive/sokoloff-kahn.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/C5L4-XZ6H]. 
86 See supra Part II. 
858         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:831 
 
 While much of the economic literature in this area focuses on 
patents, similar points can be made with respect to copyright. With 
the ease of copying and distribution afforded by modern digital 
networks, content creators would seem to be at a serious 
disadvantage compared to copiers. Without copyright there would 
be nothing to stop copiers from simply copying movies, books, 
articles, and music and selling, trading, or allowing others to make 
free copies.87 Prior to international copyright treaties, like the 
Berne Convention or Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property, this was exactly what happened.88 
Consider the costs hidden in the creation of a song or CD. 
From music lessons to recording software, demo tapes, numerous 
hours practicing and honing musical skills, not to mention eating 
and paying the electricity bill, there are lots of costs hidden in a 
song, album, or CD. A “professional album,” Mathew Barblan 
writes, includes “costs for the studio, recording engineer, producer, 
studio musicians, back-up singers, mixing, and mastering, can push 
the price tag into the hundreds of thousands of dollars.”89 
                                                                                                             
87 Michael Smith, Brett Danaher, and Rahaul Telang note that “in the 10 years 
following Napster’s introduction in 1999, global recorded music sales decreased 50%  . . . 
DVD/VHS sales . . . fell 27% in the four years after the widespread adoption of the 
BitTorrent protocol in 2004.” Brett Danaher, Michael D. Smith, & Rahul Telang, 
Copyright Enforcement in the Digital Age: Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications, 
60 COMM. OF THE ACM 68 (2017). Michael Smith and Rahul Telang also note “that 
traffic from the popular file-sharing protocol BitTorrent accounted for [thirty-one] 
percent of all North American Internet traffic during peak-traffic periods in 2008.” 
MICHAEL SMITH & RAHUL TELANG, STREAMING, SHARING, AND STEALING: BIG DATA THE 
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 9 (2016) [hereinafter, STREAMING, SHARING, AND STEALING]. 
88 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, opened for 
signature Sept. 9, 1886, 828 U.N.T.S. 221, S. Treaty Doc. No. 99-27 (1986) (revised at 
Paris, July 24, 1971, amended in 1979) [hereinafter Berne]; Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (1988) (entered into 
force for the United States Mar. 1, 1989) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988 & Supp. V 
1993)); Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14, 33 I.L.M. 1143 (1994); TRIPS: 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994; 
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 
U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) in THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF 
MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS: THE LEGAL TEXTS 1–19, at 365–403 (Gatt 
Secretariat ed., 1994) [hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement]. See sources supra note 79 and 
accompanying text. 
89 Matthew Barblan, Copyright as a Platform for Artistic and Creative Freedom, 23 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 795 (2016). 
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Production and distribution costs are even more profound when 
considering movies or plays.90 Sean O’Connor notes, “it should be 
clear that no one would invest without some appropriation 
mechanism that would provide them with a favorable return on 
their investment through the monetization of the commercialized 
goods or services. If they cannot see a way to get such a return, 
they will not make the investment.”91 Simply put, with millions in 
production and distribution costs at stake, movies or other sorts of 
content would not be made without some sort of process where 
creators could recoup these costs.92 These claims are further 
supported by the recent work of Michael Smith and Rahul Telang, 
who argue that piracy harms both producers and consumers by 
undermining the income streams of producers, resulting in less 
content being created and consumed.93 
                                                                                                             
90 For some of the benefits and limitations of “the world’s greatest naturally occurring 
experiment in cultural production without copyright: the burgeoning audiovisual industry 
of Nigeria, aka “Nollywood,” see Justin Hughes, Motion Pictures, Markets, and 
Copylocks, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 941 (2016). 
91 Sean M. O’Connor, Creators, Innovators, and Appropriation Mechanisms, 22 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 973, 982 (2015). 
92 Adam Mossoff has argued that even in the area of scholarly production of research, 
an area where economic incentives don’t seem to apply, that “copyright incentivizes the 
business models necessary for converting a new scientific discovery or technical 
invention into a standardized and high-quality article that communicates this information 
to other scholars and researchers.” Adam Mossoff, How Copyright Drives Innovation: A 
Case Study of Scholarly Publishing in the Digital World, 3 MICH. ST. L. REV. 955 (2016). 
93 See, STREAMING, SHARING, AND STEALING, supra note 87. “Using data from all wide 
release movies in the US from 2006 to 2008 we predict that if piracy could be eliminated 
from the theatrical window then box-office revenues would increase by 16% or $1.3b per 
year.” Liye Ma, Alan L. Montgomery, & Michael D. Smith, The Dual Impact of Movie 
Piracy on Box-Office Revenue: Cannibalization and Promotion, J. MKT. RES. 1, 2 (2016),  
https://www.andrew.cmu.edu/user/alm3/papers/movie%20piracy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/L6ZA-586N].  Movie piracy is also implicated in the economic 
downturn confronting independent movie producers and art-house labels. Without the 
ability to tie movie revenues to t-shirts, action figures, and theme parks, and thus recoup 
losses from piracy, independent movie producers are struggling. “If piracy continues to 
be rampant like this, then in four to five years it will be the end of the independent film 
business as we know it . . . .” Nelson Granados, How Piracy Is Still Hurting the 
Filmmakers and Artists You Admire, FORBES (Dec. 3, 2015, 12:08 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nelsongranados/2015/12/03/how-piracy-hurts-the-
filmmakers-and-artists-you-admire/#26bc9f234554 [https://perma.cc/PC7F-R3BY] 
(internal citations omitted). 
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Finally, I am well aware that the evidence offered in this 
section is not conclusive. At best, all that has been demonstrated is 
that the institutions of patent, copyright, and trade secret protection 
likely provide incentives to innovate. Societies that adopt these 
practices tend to do better in terms of overall well-being compared 
to societies that do not. In any case, conclusive support for the 
claim that patent, copyright, and trade secret are optimal in terms 
of producing overall well-being is not necessary for the argument 
under consideration. If it is likely that copying leads to a sub-
optimal result and that not copying yields a collectively superior 
result, then all that is needed is some form of sanction or process 
that pushes would-be copiers in the optimal direction. 
 
IV.  COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, AND TRADE SECRETS AS PATHS 
TOWARD COLLECTIVE OPTIMALITY 
“But why copyrights, patents, and trade secrets?” you might 
ask. If the position under consideration holds, some form of 
protection is needed—some way to make it in everyone’s best 
interest to not copy. Institutions of copyright, patent, and trade 
secret are not necessary for this purpose, although they may be 
sufficient.94 By changing the payoffs of the intellectual property 
prisoner’s dilemma through the use of copyrights, patents, and 
trade secrets, a path toward collective optimality will have been 
opened. 
Within the Anglo-American tradition, intellectual property is 
protected by the legal regimes of copyright, patent, and trade 
secret.95 Copyright protection extends to original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression.96 Works 
                                                                                                             
94 Other protection “tweaks” could also be implemented. For example, legal 
obligations to remove pirate sites from search engine results have been shown to be an 
effective strategy. See Smith & Telang, supra note 87, at 96. 
95 Trademark and the law of ideas, two areas of law with significant overlap into the 
realm of intellectual property, will not be discussed. 
96 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988). The three major restrictions on the bundle of rights that 
surround copyright are (1) fair use, under 17 U.S.C. § 107 and per District Judge Leval’s 
opinion in New Era Publications Intern. v. Henry Holt and Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); (2) limited duration (17 U.S.C. § 302); and (3) the first sale rule under 
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that may be copyrighted include books, songs, photographs, 
movies, maps, architectural designs and computer software.97 
There are five exclusive rights that copyright owners enjoy and 
three major restrictions on these rights. The five rights are the right 
to reproduce the work, to adapt it or derive other works from it, to 
distribute copies of the work, to display the work publicly, and to 
perform it publicly.98 Each of these rights may be parsed out and 
sold separately.99 All five rights lapse after the lifetime of the 
author plus 70 years;100 and in the case of works for hire, the term 
is set at 95 years from publication or 120 years from creation, 
whichever comes first.101 
The domain or subject matter of patent protection is the 
invention and discovery of new and useful processes, machines, 
articles of manufacture, or compositions of matter.102 Patents yield 
the strongest form of protection, in that a twenty-year exclusive 
monopoly is granted over any expression or implementation of the 
protected work.103 The bundle of rights conferred on a patent 
owner includes the right to make, the right to use, the right to sell, 
                                                                                                             
17 U.S.C. § 109(a). The first sale rule prevents a copyright holder who has sold copies of 
the protected work from later interfering with the subsequent sale of those copies. It 
should also be noted that copyright protection does not exclude independent original 
creation—for example, if an author independently creates a work that is substantially 
similar to a copyrighted expression then, he can obtain copyright protection. See 17 
U.S.C. § 106 (1976). 
97 Copyright code was amended in 1988 to include computer software. See 17 U.S.C. § 
102 (1988). 
98 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
99 See id. 
100 See 17 U.S.C.§ 302. 
101 See id. The Constitution requires limited terms for copyright and patent protections. 
The Constitution empowers Congress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful 
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). The 
other two restrictions are “fair use” and “first sale.” 17 U.S.C. §§ 107–08. 
102 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984 & Supp. 1989). Patents may be granted when the subject 
matter satisfies the criteria of utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 
101–07. Unlike copyright, patent law protects the totality of the idea, expression, and 
implementation. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–07. 
103 The Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The 1995 version of the Patent Act has 
added three years to the term of patent protection—from seventeen to twenty. See 35 
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
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and the right to authorize others to sell the patented item.104 
Moreover, the bundle of rights conferred by a patent excludes 
others from making, using, or selling the invention, regardless of 
independent creation.105 
A trade secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device, or 
compilation of information that is used in one’s business.106 Trade 
secrecy laws rely entirely on private measures, rather than state 
action, to maintain exclusivity.107 Furthermore, the subject matter 
of a trade secret is almost unlimited in terms of the content of the 
information that is subject to protection.108 Within the secrecy 
requirement, owners of trade secrets enjoy management rights and 
are protected from misappropriation.109 
Given the argument so far, there is nothing that necessitates 
copyrights that last the author’s lifetime plus seventy years, or 
patents that last twenty years. All that is needed to avoid sub-
optimal results is a sanction that changes the payoffs of the 
prisoner’s dilemma, making cooperation or not copying, the 
prudent act. The modern institutions of patent, copyright, and trade 
secret perform this function. Moreover, these institutions are 
already in place. 
Again, consider Crusoe and Friday playing a prisoner’s 
dilemma game where they are each considering if copying and 
violating the other’s copyright is the best option. Both may well 
take heed to consider that the willful infringement of a copyright 
can result in a $150,000 penalty and up to five years in jail. In this 
new game, with copyright sanctions in place, the best option is to 
not copy.  
                                                                                                             
104 See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1984 & Supp. 1989). 
105 See id. 
106 See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 39–45 (Am. Law 
Inst. 1995) (containing the most current information about the law of trade secrets). The 
two major restrictions on the domain of trade secrets are the requirements of secrecy and 
competitive advantage. Although trade secret rights have no built-in sunset, they are 
extremely limited in one important respect; owners of trade secrets have exclusive rights 
to make use of the secret but only as long as the secret is maintained. If the secret is made 
public by the owner, then the trade secret protection lapses and anyone can make use of 
it. Moreover, the rights of the owner do not exclude independent invention or discovery. 
107 Id. at comment g. 
108 Id. at comment d. 
109 Id. at comment f. 
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Figure 3: 
 
Similarly, for patent infringement, the plaintiffs can be 
awarded an injunction against further use and “damages adequate 
to compensate” for the unauthorized use.110 Along with an 
injunction against the use of the misappropriated information, 
owners of trade secrets may be entitled to compensatory damages, 
lost royalties, and punitive damages.111 With copyright, patent, and 
trade secret institutions in place, along with appropriate 
enforcement mechanisms, we have changed the payoffs of iterated, 
multi-player, intellectual property, prisoner’s dilemma games.  Not 
copying becomes the dominant strategy. 
Note, there is nothing in the argument offered so far that would 
prohibit copyrights that last for fifteen years or patents that last 
five years.112 We could eliminate exclusive patent monopolies and 
allow those who independently innovate to obtain protection along 
with current patent holders.113 Fair use could be weakened or 
strengthened, as with forced patent licensing. So long as incentives 
to innovate are maintained, which include enforced sanctions 
                                                                                                             
110 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–289 (1984 & Supp. 1989). 
111 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 44–45 (Am. Law Inst. 
1995). 
112 For arguments regarding the optimal length of patent protection, see WILLIAM D. 
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE (MIT Press 1969). For arguments regarding the optimal length 
of copyright protection, see Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen Margolis, Seventeen Famous 
Economists Weigh in on Copyright: The Role of Theory, Empirics, And Network Effects, 
18 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 435 (2005). 
113 For an argument to abandon exclusive patent monopolies, see Moore, Lockean 
Theory, supra note 9, at 74. 
864         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:831 
 
against copying, we will have provided ourselves reasons to avoid 
what narrow self-interest and prudence would otherwise dictate. 
Rather than focusing on content creation, imitation, and 
copying within a country, it is possible to look more broadly and 
consider if a prisoner’s dilemma arises between states or citizens of 
different countries.114 Peter Andreas writes: 
In its adolescent years, the [United States] was a 
hotbed of intellectual piracy and technology 
smuggling, particularly in the textile industry, 
acquiring both machines and skilled machinists in 
violation of British export and emigration laws. 
Only after it had become a mature industrial power 
did the country vigorously campaign for 
intellectual-property protection.115 
Andreas notes further that Alexander Hamilton, in his 1791 
“Report on Manufactures” to the House of Representatives, argued 
for the wholesale theft of technology from Europe.116 Moreover, 
the first U.S. Patent Act of 1790 allowed for the theft of foreign 
intellectual property and subsequent protection within the United 
States.117 
An interesting case study of an intellectual property prisoner’s 
dilemma between countries is found in Eric Schiff’s book, 
Industrialization Without National Patents.118 Schiff, and those 
who cite him, fail to see that the success of the Netherlands and 
Switzerland in maintaining or advancing industrialization in the 
late 1800s/early 1900s was parasitic on the intellectual property 
institutions of other countries. For example, an innovator in the 
Netherlands circa 1885 could not patent his intellectual work 
domestically, but because of membership in the International 
                                                                                                             
114 See generally Bugbee, supra note 61. 
115 Peter Andreas, Piracy and Fraud Propelled the U.S. Industrial Revolution, 
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 1, 2013, 11:24 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2013-
02-01/piracy-and-fraud-propelled-the-u-s-industrial-revolution [https://perma.cc/F9D9-
Q9DC]. 
116 Alexander Hamilton, REPORT ON MANUFACTURES (presented to the House of 
Representatives, Dec. 5, 1791), http://constitution.org/ah/rpt_manufactures.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7CPF-3SK4]. 
117 See Patent Act of 1790, Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109–112 (1790). 
118 SCHIFF, supra note 54,  at 513. See also Boldrin & Levine, supra note 54, at 7. 
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Union, he could patent his work in France, Germany, and the 
United States, thus securing income from his efforts.119 Schiff 
notes, “one of the basic principles of the International Union 
was . . . that with respect to protection of industrial property every 
member country should treat the citizens or residents of any other 
country just as it treats its own nationals, even if the latter enjoy 
less protection or none at all in the foreign country.”120 Moreover, 
given that there was no patent system in the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, innovations from outside these countries were able to 
be imported and operationalized without sanctions.121 Patent 
institutions generally require disclosure,122 which made it 
exceedingly easy to copy and exploit the efforts of others in 
countries without patent institutions. In the optimal case, citizens 
and corporations in foreign countries with patent institutions must 
comply with your patent rights, while domestically—where your 
business resides—you can safely ignore their patent claims. 
In response to this sort of activity, at the 1887 meetings of the 
International Union, the United States proposed that “any 
invention that is not patentable in the country of origin, may be 
excluded from protection in any other member country that finds it 
expedient to exclude it.”123 More telling language was used by W. 
Stuber, a German national, who referenced the Swiss people as 
“robber barons” and “parasites.”124 Foreshowing the TRIPS 
agreement discussed below, in response to the Swiss theft of 
German intellectual efforts, in 1907 Germany threatened tariffs on 
various Swiss products.125 By 1910, both the Netherlands and 
Switzerland had adopted patent institutions.126 
                                                                                                             
119 See generally Boldrin & Levine, supra note 54. 
120 Schiff, supra note 54, at 89. 
121 Id. at 69–101. 
122 See generally Corinne Langinier & GianCarlo Moschini, The Economics of Patents: 
An Overview (Ctr. for Agric. and Rural Dev., Working Paper No. 02-WP 293, 2002), 
https://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/18374/1/wp020293.pdf [https://perma.cc/LT2C-
YHSM]. 
123 SCHIFF, supra note 54, at 93 (citing F. Meili, Die Prinzipien des Schweizerichen 
Patentgesetzes 11 (1890)). 
124 Id. at 94 (citing W. Stuber, Die Patentierbarkeit Chemischer Erfindungen (1907)). 
125 Machlup supra note 58, at 5. 
126 Id. 
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Similar problems with copyright also occurred in the United 
States. Traveling in the United States in 1842 Charles Dickens 
wrote: 
Is it not a horrible thing that scoundrel booksellers 
should grow rich here from publishing books, the 
authors of which do not reap one farthing from their 
issue by scores of thousands; . . . Is it tolerable that 
besides being robbed and rifled an author should be 
forced to appear in any form, in any vulgar dress, in 
any atrocious company; that he should have no 
choice of his audience, no control over his own 
distorted text, and that he should be compelled to 
jostle out of the course the best men in this country 
who only ask to live by writing? I vow before high 
heaven that my blood so boils at these enormities, 
that when I speak about them I seem to grow twenty 
feet high, and to swell out in proportion. ‘Robbers 
that ye are.’127 
Dickens was railing against the practice of bribing English 
publishers, obtaining advance copies of books, and then selling 
these copies throughout the United States without compensating 
the authors.128 With no international copyright protections, there 
was little Dickens or other writers could do about these practices. 
Moreover, given that U.S. authors were not as yet producing at the 
same rate as their English counterparts,129 U.S. publishers had little 
to lose and lots to gain by participating in this practice. 
After Dickens was joined by Mark Twain and others, the U.S. 
reversed course in 1891 by enacting the Chace Act.130 “The 
absence of international copyright laws allowed Canadian 
publishers to prey on Mark Twain’s early books. He was hurt 
badly in 1876, when the Toronto publisher Charles Belford issued 
                                                                                                             
127 CHARLES DICKENS, THE SELECTED LETTERS OF CHARLES DICKENS, 230 (Jenny 
Hartley ed., 2012). 
128 Id. 
129 See PETER BALDWIN, THE COPYRIGHT WARS: THREE CENTURIES OF TRANSATLANTIC 
BATTLE 113 (2014). 
130 International Copyright Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 1106; see Thorvald Solberg, The 
International Copyright Union, 91 ADVOCATE OF PEACE THROUGH JUSTICE 98 (1929). 
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Tom Sawyer before the American edition even appeared.”131 Twain 
also noted a second kind of harm visited upon authors unprotected 
by international copyrights. Domestic publishing houses would 
earn higher profits by publishing unauthorized copies of foreign 
authors because there were no royalty costs.132 This practice had 
the effect of suppressing innovative activity within the U.S. 
Nevertheless, as innovation increased in the United States, Canada, 
Australia, and other markets, and as reverse theft, industrial 
espionage, and unauthorized copying occurred, these countries 
found it in their interest to join together and enact international 
intellectual property legislation.133 Given that there was no 
authority by which one country could force another to adopt 
international copyright and patent protection, content creating 
countries simply had to wait until emerging counties developed 
their own markets of innovation.134 
This was not the case for what is now known as the TRIPS 
agreement of 1994.135 The TRIPS “regime provides mechanisms 
for both the United States and the European Union to enforce 
provisions that increase protection in newly industrialized and 
developing nations.”136 Simply put, if a developing nation wanted 
access to U.S. or E.U. markets, then they have to agree to 
international protections for intellectual property.137 While 
                                                                                                             
131 Philip V. Allingham, Nineteenth-Century British and American Copyright Law, THE 
VICTORIAN WEB (Jan. 5, 2001), http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/pva
/pva74.html [https://perma.cc/FEJ5-AFM2] (quoting R. RASMUSEN & R. KENT, MARK 
TWAIN A TO Z: THE ESSENTIAL REFERENCE TO HIS LIFE AND WRITINGS 54 (1995)) 
132 Philip V. Allingham, Nineteenth-Century British and American Copyright Law, THE 
VICTORIAN WEB (Jan. 5, 2001), http://www.victorianweb.org/authors/dickens/pva
/pva74.html [https://perma.cc/CJ32-LTZ4]. 
133 See John Tehranian, The Emperor Has No Copyright: Registration, Cultural 
Hierarchy, and the Myth of American Copyright Militancy, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1399, 1406 (2009); Hal Varian, Copying and Copyright, 19 J. OF ECON. PERSPECTIVES 
121, 121–38 (2005); David Nimmer, Nation, Duration, Violation, Harmonization: An 
International Copyright Proposal for the United States, 55 LAW & CONTEMPORARY 
PROBLEMS 211 (1992). 
134 See generally Tehranian, supra note 133. 
135 See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 88. 
136 Hugh C. Hansen, International Copyright: An Unorthodox Analysis, 23 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 447 (2013); see also, Marci Hamilton, The TRIPS 
Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613 
(1996). 
137 Hamilton, supra note 136, at 617. 
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developing nations might have comparatively little innovative 
activity to protect in signing the TRIPS agreement, they have a lot 
to lose by being restricted from U.S. and E.U. markets. Obviously, 
these sanctions change the payoffs of the prisoner’s dilemma game 
and allow a way out without waiting for countries to develop their 
own innovative industries.138 
CONCLUSION 
In this Article, and setting aside various foundational moral 
entanglements, an argument has been offered for the protection of 
intellectual property based on individual self-interest and prudence. 
If copying becomes too widespread, or if enforcement mechanisms 
fail, then we will inevitably spiral toward the collectively sub-
optimal result of suppressing innovation and content creation. 
Through the use of sanctions against copying the intellectual 
efforts of others, we give ourselves compelling reasons to pursue a 
collectively superior outcome. 
We could dismantle copyright, patent, and trade secrete 
institutions and build some different set of legal or societal 
instruments to deter copying and incentivize innovation. Arguably, 
such efforts would be politically and economically impractical. It 
is as if we have sectioned off Hardin’s commons with assigned 
property rights and protective legal instruments, find that this 
system works, and are now considering whether replacing these 
institutions with some other arrangement would allow us to avoid 
the tragedy of the commons in some better way. There may be a 
better way, but the costs of such a shift would be massive and 
taking such a gamble would be rather imprudent.139 
                                                                                                             
138 Admittedly, many find the TRIPS “agreement” rather hollow, claiming that it is 
based on bullying by the United States and EU. China was not considered for WTO or 
TRIPS membership until several years after the initial agreement. See Natalie P. 
Stoianoff, The Influence of the WTO over China’s Intellectual Property Regime, 34 
SIDNEY L. REV. 65–89 (2012); Robert M. Sherwood, Why a Uniform Intellectual 
Property System Makes Sense for the World, in GLOBAL DIMENSIONS OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 68 (Mitchel B. Wallerstein et al. eds., 
1993). 
139 See generally Machlup supra note 58; Moore, Incentive Based Arguments, supra 
note 2. 
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Alternatively, we could modify our current institutions, 
tweaking things here and there to optimize access and incentives to 
create.140 So long as we give ourselves compelling reasons to 
refrain from narrowly prudent and self-interested copying or 
imitation, we can avoid the sub-optimal results and aim at 
collectively rational payoffs. We already have institutions in place 
that allow us to avoid a tragedy of the commons related to 
intellectual property. 
What is objectionable with the copying and pirating of 
computer software, music, machine designs, and other forms of 
intellectual property is that, in most cases, we are acting on an 
impulse that likely thwarts our own wider interests. “I want 
freedom over time in jail. I want more content, leisure time, health, 
software, and entertainment. No one is harmed by my taking.” I 
dare say that only those who are not employed as content creators, 
or those inventors funded in some other way, typically make such 
claims. Even more cynically, many who hold such views attempt 
to undermine the protections for other content creators and 
innovators, while at the same time using government to secure 
their own intellectual property rights. Everyone has prudential and 
self-interest based reasons to avoid content piracy or illegitimate 
copying. “Copying the creations of others because I can” may feel 
good in the moment, but once understood as a prisoner’s dilemma, 
where such behavior yields all of us sub-optimal results, we can 
more easily support—imperfect as they are—the institutions of 
copyright, patent, and trade secret. 
                                                                                                             
140 See infra notes 106–07 and accompanying text. For additional examples, see Adam 
Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents, in INNOVATION POLICY AND THE 
ECONOMY 27–65 (William Kerr, Josh Lerner, & Scot Stern eds., 2015). 
